A FEW WORDS ON NON-INTERVENTION

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There is a country in Europe, equal to the greatest in extent of dominion, far exceeding any other in wealth, and in the power that wealth bestows, the declared principle of whose foreign policy is, to let other nations alone. No country apprehends or affects to apprehend from it any aggressive designs. Power, from of old, is wont to encroach upon the weak, and to quarrel for ascendency with those who are as strong as itself. Not so this nation. It will hold its own, it will not submit to encroachment, but if other nations do not meddle with it, it will not meddle with them. Any attempt it makes to exert influence over them, even by persuasion, is rather in the service of others, than of itself: to mediate in the quarrels which break out between foreign States, to arrest obstinate civil wars, to reconcile belligerents, to intercede for mild treatment of the vanquished, or finally, to procure the abandonment of some national crime and scandal to humanity, such as the slave-trade. Not only does this nation desire no benefit to itself at the expense of other, it desires none in which all others do not freely participate. It makes no treaties stipulating for separate commercial advantages. If the aggressions of barbarians force it to successful war, and its victorious arms put it in a position to command liberty of trade, whatever it demands for itself it demands for all mankind. The cost of the war is its own; the fruits it shares in a moral equality with the whole human race. Its own ports and commerce are free as the air and the sky: all its neighbours have full liberty to resort to it, paying either no duties, or, if any, generally a mere equivalent for what is paid by its own citizens; nor does it concern itself though they, on their part, keep all to themselves, and persist in the most jealous and narrow-minded exclusion of its merchants and goods.

A nation adopting this policy is a novelty in the world; so much so that it would appear that many are unable to believe it when they see it. By one of the practical paradoxes which often meet us in human affairs, it is this nation which finds itself, in respect of its foreign policy, held up to obloquy as the type of egoism and selfishness; as a nation which thinks of nothing but of out-witting and out-generalling its neighbours. An enemy, or a self-fancied rival who had been distanced in the race, might be conceived to give vent to such an accusation in a moment of ill-temper. But that it should be accepted by lookers-on, and should pass into a popular doctrine, is enough to surprise even those who have best sounded the depths of human prejudice. Such, however, is the estimate of the foreign policy of England most widely current on the Continent. Let us not flatter ourselves that it is merely the dishonest pretence of enemies, or of those who have their own purposes to serve by exciting odium against us, a class including all the Protectionist writers, and the mouthpieces of all the despots and of the Papacy. The more blameless and laudable our policy might be, the more certainly we might count on its being misrepresented, and railed at by those whom they can influence, but is held with all the tenacity of a prejudice, by innumerable persons free from interested bias. So strong a hold has it on their minds, that when an Englishman attempts to remove it, all their habitual politeness does not enable them to disguise their utter unbelief in his disclaimer. They are finnly persuaded that no word is said, nor act done, by English statesmen in reference to foreign affairs, which has not for its motive principle some peculiarly English interest. Any profession of the contrary appears to them too ludicrously transparent an attempt to impose upon them. Those most friendly to us think they make a great concession in admitting that the fault may possibly be less with the English people, than with the English Government and aristocracy. We do not even receive credit from them for following our own interest with a straightforward recognition of honesty as the best policy. They believe that we have always other objects than those we avow; and the most far-fetched and un plausible suggestion of a selfish purpose appears to them better entitled to credence than anything so utterly incredible as our disinterestedness. Thus, to give one instance among many, when we taxed ourselves twenty millions (a prodigious sum in their estimation) to get rid of negro slavery, and, for the same object, perilled, as everybody thought, destroyed as many thought, the very existence of our West Indian colonies, it was, and still is, believed that our fine professions were but to delude the world, and that by this self-sacrificing behaviour we were endeavouring to gain some hidden object, which could neither be conceived nor described, in the way of pulling down other nations. The fox who had lost his tail had an intelligible interest in persuading his neighbours to rid themselves of theirs; but we, it is thought by our neighbours, cut off our own magnificent brush, the largest and finest of all, in hopes of reaping some inexplicable advantage from inducing others to do the same.

It is foolish attempting to despise all this - persuading ourselves that it is not our fault, and that those who disbelieve us would not believe though one should rise from the dead. Nations, like individuals, ought so suspect some fault in themselves when they find they are generally worse thought of than they think they deserve; and they may well know that they are somehow in fault when almost everybody but themselves thinks them crafty and hypocritical. It is not solely because England has been more successful than other nations in gaining what they are all aiming at, that they think she must be following after it with a more ceaseless and a more undivided chase. This indeed is a powerful predisposing cause, inclining and preparing them for the belief. It is a natural suppos-ition that those who win the prize have striven for it; that superior success must be the fruit of more unremitting endeavour; and where there is an obvious abstinence from the ordinary arts employed for distanc ing competitors, and they are distanced nevertheless, people are fond of believing that the means employed must have been arts still more subtle and profound. This preconception makes them look out in all quarters for indications to prop up the selfish explanation of our conduct. If our ordinary course of action does not favour this interpretation, they watch for exceptions to our ordinary course, and regard these as the real index to the purposes within. They moreover accept literally all the habitual expressions by which we represent ourselves as worse than we are; expressions often heard from English statesmen, next to never from those of any other country - partly because Englishmen, beyond all the rest of the human race, are so shy of professing virtues that they will even profess vices instead; and partly because almost all English statesmen, while careless to a degree which no foreigner can credit, respecting the impression they produce on foreigners, commit the obtuse blunder of supposing that low objects are the only ones to which the minds of their non-aristocratic fellow-citIyIen are amenable, and that it is always expedient, if not necessary, to place those objects in the foremost rank.

All, therefore, who either speak or act in the name of England, are bound by the strongest obligations, both of prudence and of duty, to avoid giving either of these handles for misconstruction: to put a severe restraint upon the mania of professing to act from meaner motives than those by which we are really actuated, and to beware of perversely or capriciously singling out some particular instance in which to act on a worse principle than that by which we are ordinarily guided. Both these salutary cautions our practical statesmen are, at the present time, flagrantly disregarding.

We are now in one of those critical moments, which do not occur once in a generation, when the whole turn of European events, and the course of European history for a long time to come, may depend on the conduct and on the estimation of England. At such a moment, it is difficult to say whether by their sins of speech or of action our
statesmen are most effectually playing into the hands of our enemies, and giving most colour of justice to injurious misconception of our character and policy as a people.

To take the sins of speech first: What is the sort of language held in every oration which, during the present European crisis, any English minister, or almost any considerable public man, address to Parliament or to his constituents? The eternal repetition of this shabby refrain - 'We did not interfere, because no English interest was involved;''We ought not to interfere where no English interest is concerned.' England is thus exhibited as a country who most distinguished men are not ashamed to profess, as politicians, a rule of action which no one, not utterly base, could endure to be accused of as the maxim by which he guides his private life; not to move a finger for others unless he sees his private advantage in it. There is much to be said for the doctrine that a nation should be willing to assist its neighbours in throwing off oppression and gaining free institutions. Much also may be said by those who maintain that one nation is incompetent to judge and act for another, and that each should be left to help itself, and seek advantage or submit to disadvantage as it can and will. But of all attitudes which a nation can take up on the subject of intervention, the meanest and worst is to profess that it interferes only when it can serve its own objects by it. Every other nation is entitled to say, 'It seems, then, that non-interference is not a matter of principle with you. When you abstain from interference, it is not because you think it wrong. You have no object-ion to interfere, only it must not be for the sake of those you interfere with; they must not suppose that you have any regard for their good. The good of others is not one of the things you care for; but you are willing to meddle, if by meddling you can gain any thing for yourselves.' Such is the obvious interpretations of the language used.

There is scarcely any necessity to say, writing to Englishmen, that this is not what our rulers and politicians really mean. Their language is not a correct exponent of their thoughts. They mean a part only of what they seem to say. They do mean to disclaim interference for the sake of doing good to foreign nations. They are quite sincere and in what they seem to say. They do mean to abstain from interference, it is not because you think it wrong. You have no object-ion to interfere, only it must not be for the sake of those you interfere with; they must not suppose that you have any regard for their good. The good of others is not one of the things you care for; but you are willing to meddle, if by meddling you can gain any thing for yourselves.' Such is the obvious interpretations of the language used.

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It is the universal belief in France that English influence at Constantinople, strenuously exerted to defeat this project, is the real and only invincible obstacle to its being carried into effect. And unhappily the public declarations of our present Prime Minister not only bear out this persuasion, but warrant the assertion that we oppose the work because, in the opinion of our Government, it would be injurious to the interest of England. If such be the course we are pursuing, and such the motives of it, and if nations have duties, even negative ones, towards the weal of the human race, it is hard to say whether the folly or the immorality of our conduct is the most painfully conspicuous.

Here is a project, the practicability of which is indeed a matter in dispute, but of which no one has attempted to deny that, supposing it realised, it would give a facility to commerce, and consequently a stimulus to production, an encouragement to intercourse, and therefore to civilisation, which would entitle it to a high rank among the great industrial improvements of modern times. The contriving of new means of abridging labour and economising outlay in the operations of industry, is the object to which the larger half of all inventive ingenuity of mankind is at present given up; and this scheme, if realised, will save, on one of the great highways of the world's traffic, the circumnavigation of a continent. An easy access of commerce is realised, will save, on one of the great highways of the world's traffic,

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enterprise of worldwide importance because it abridges the transport of mercantile intelligence merely. What the Suez Canal would shorten is the transport of the goods themselves, and this to such an extent as probably to augment it manifold.

Let us suppose, then - for the present day the hypothesis is too un-English to be spoken of as anything more than a supposition - let us suppose that the English nation saw in this great benefit to the civilised and uncivilised world a danger or damage to some peculiar interest of England. Suppose, for example, that it feared, by shortening the road,

to facilitate the access of foreign navies to its Oriental possessions. The supposition imputes no ordinary degree of cowardice and imbecility to the national mind; otherwise it could not but reflect that the same thing which would facilitate the arrival of an enemy, would facilitate also that of succour; that we have had French fleets in the Eastern seas before now, and have fought naval battles with them there, nearly a century ago; that if we ever became unable to defend India against them, we should assuredly have them there without the aid of any canal; and that our power of resisting an enemy does not depend upon putting a little more or less of obstacle in the way of his coming, but upon the amount of force which we are able to oppose to him when he come. Let us assume, however, that the success of the project would do more harm to England in some separate capacity, than the good which, as the chief material nation, she would reap from the great increase of commercial intercourse. Let us grant this: and I now ask, what then? Is there any morality, Christian or secular, which is this but to declare that its interest and that of mankind are the human race is bad for itself, and to withstand it accordingly? What is a advantage, because the consequences of their obtaining it may be to now ask, what then? Is there any morality, Christian or secular, which

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As a matter of private opinion, the present writer, so far as he has looked into the evidence, inclines to agree with those who think that the scheme cannot be executed, at least by the means and with the funds proposed. But this is a consideration for the shareholders. The British Government does not deem it any part of its business to prevent individuals, even British citizens, from wasting their own money in unsuccessful speculations, though holding out no prospect of great public usefulness in the event of success. And if, though at the cost of their own property, they acted as pioneers to others, and the scheme, though a losing one to those who first undertook it, should, in the same or in other hands, realise the full expected amount of ultimate benefit to the world at large, it would not be the first nor the hundredth time that an unprofitable enterprise has had this for the final result.

There seems to be no little need that the whole doctrine of non-interference with foreign nations should be reconsidered, if it can be said to have as yet been considered as a really moot question at all. We have heard something lately about being willing to go to war for an idea. To go to war for an idea, if the war is aggressive, not defensive, is as criminal as to go to war for territory of revenue; for it is as little justifiable to force our ideas on other people, as to compel them to submit to our will in any other respect. But there assuredly are cases in which it is allowable to go to war, without having been ourselves attacked, or threatened with attack; and it is very important that nations should make up their minds in time, as to what these cases are. There are few questions which more require to be taken in hand by ethical and political philosophers, with a view to establish some rule or criterion whereby the justifiableness of intervening in the affairs of other countries, and (what is sometimes fully as questionable) the justifiableness of refraining from any intervention, may be brought to a definite and rational test. Whoever attempts this, will be led to recognise more than one fundamental distinction, not yet by any means familiar to the public mind, and in general quite lost sight of by those who write in strains of indignant morality on the subject. There is a great difference (for example) between the case in which the nations concerned are of the same, or something like the same, degree of civilisation, and that in which one of the parties to the situation is of a high, and the other of a very low, grade of social improvement. To suppose that the same international customs, and the same rules of international morality, can obtain between one civilised nation and another, and between civilised nations and barbarians, is a grave error, and one which no statesman can fall into, however it may be with those who, from a safe and irresponsible position, criticise statesmen. Among many reasons why the same rules cannot be applicable to situations so different, the two following are among the most important. In the first place, the rules of ordinary inter-national morality imply reciprocity. But barbarians will not reciprocate. They cannot be depended on for observing any rules. Their minds are not capable of so great an effort, nor will their sufficiently under the influence of distant motives. In the next place, nations which are still barbarous have not yet got beyond the period during which it is likely to be for their benefit that they should be conquered and held in subjection by foreigners. Independence and nationality, so essential to the due growth and development of a people further advanced in improvement, are generally impediments to theirs. The sacred duties which civilised nations owe to the independence are either a certain evil, or at best a questionable good. The Romans were not the most clean-handed of conquerors, yet would it have been better for Gaul and Spain, Numidia and Dacia, never to have formed a part of the Roman Empire? To characterise any conduct whatever towards a barbarous people as a violation of the law of nations, only shows that he who so speaks has never considered the subject. A violation of
great principles of morality it may easily be; but barbarians have no
rights as a nation, except a right to such treatment as may, at the
earliest possible period, fit them for becoming one. The only moral
laws for the relation between a civilised and a barbarous government,
are the universal rules of morality between man and man.

The criticisms, therefore, which are so often made upon the conduct of
the French in Algeria, or of the English in India, proceed, it would
seem, mostly on a wrong principle. The true standard by which to
detect their proceedings never having been laid down, they escape
such commend and censure as might really have an improving effect,
while they are tried by a standard which can have no influence on
those practically engaged in such transactions, knowing as they do that
it cannot, and if it could, ought not to be observed, because no human
being would be the better, and many much the worse, for its
observance. A civilised government cannot help having barbarous
neighbours: when it has, it cannot always content itself with a
defensive position, one of mere resistance to aggression. After a
longer or shorter interval of forbearance, it either finds itself obliged to
conquer them, or to assert so much authority over them, and so break
their spirit, that they gradually sink into a state of dependence upon
itself: and when that time arrives, they are indeed no longer
formidable to it, but it has had so much to do with setting up and
pulling down their governments, and they have grown so accustomed
to lean on it, that it has become morally responsible for all evil it
allows them to do. This is the history of the relations of the British
Government with the native States of India. It never was secure in its
own Indian possessions until it had reduced the military power of
those States to a nullity. But a despotical government only exists by its
military power. When we had taken away theirs, we were forced, by
the necessity of the case, to offer them ours instead of it. To enable
them to dispense with large armies of their own, we bound ourselves
to place at their disposal, and they bound themselves to receive, such
an amount of military force as made us in fact masters of the country.
We engaged that this force should fulfil the purposes of a force, by
defending the prince against all foreign and internal enemies. But
being thus assured of the protection of a civilised power, and freed
from the fear of internal rebellion or foreign conquest, the only checks
which either restrain the passions or keep any vigour in the character
of an Asiatic despot, the native Governments either became so
oppressive and extortionate as to desolate the country, or fell into such
a state of nerveless imbecility, that every one, subject to their will,
who had not the means of defending himself by his own armed
followers, was the prey of anybody who had a band of ruffians in his
pay. The British Government felt this deplorable state of things to be
its own work; being the direct consequence of the position in which,
for its own security, it had placed itself towards the native
governments. Had it permitted this to go on indefinately, it would have
deserved to be accounted among the worst political malefactors. In
some cases (unhappily not in all) it had endeavoured to take
precaution against these mischiefs by a special article in the treaty,
binding the prince to reform his administration, and in future to govern
in conformity to the advice of the British Government. Among the
treaties in which a provision of this sort had been inserted, was that
with Oude. For fifty years and more did the British Government allow
this engagement to be treated with entire disregard; not without
frequent remonstrances, and occasionally threats, but without ever
carrying into effect what it threatened. During this period of half a
century, England was morally accountable for a mixture of tyranny
and anarchy, the picture of which, by men who knew it well, is
appalling to all who read it. The act by which the Government so
pertinaciously violated, and assumed the power of fulfilling the
obligation it had so long before incurred, of giving to the people of
Oude a tolerable government, far from being the political crime it is so
often ignorantly called, was a criminally tardy discharge of an
imperative duty. And the fact, that nothing which had been done in all
this century by the East India Company's Government made it so
unpopular in England, is one of the most striking instances of what
was noticed in a former part of this article - the predisposition of
English public opinion to look unfavourably upon every act by which
territory or revenue are acquired from foreign States, and to take part
with any government, however unworthy, which can make out the
merest semblance of a case of injustice against our own country.

But among civilised peoples, members of an equal community of
nations, like Christian Europe, the question assumes another aspect,
and must be decided on totally different principles. It would be an
affront to the reader to discuss the immorality of wars of conquest, or
of conquest even as the consequence of lawful war; the annexation of
any civilised people to the dominion of another, unless by their own
spontaneous election. Up to this point, there is no difference of
opinion among honest people; nor on the wickedness of commencing
an aggressive war for any interest of our own, except when necessary
to avert from ourselves an obviously impending wrong. The disputed
question is that of interfering in the regulation of another country's
internal concerns; the question whether a nation is justified in taking
part, on either side, in the civil wars or party contests of another
and chiefly, whether it may justly and safely aid the people of another country in
struggling for liberty; or may impose on a country any particular
government or institutions, either as being best for the country itself,
or as necessary for the security of its neighbours.

Of these cases, that of a people in arms for liberty is the only one of
any nicety, or which, theoretically at least, is likely to present
conflicting moral considerations. The other cases which have been
mentioned hardly admit of discussion. Assistance to the government
of a country in keeping down the people, unhappily by far the most
frequent case of foreign intervention, no one writing in a free country
needs take the trouble of stigmatising. A government which needs
foreign support to enforce obedience from its own citizens, is one
which ought not to exist; and the assistance given to it by foreigners
is hardly every any

thing but the sympathy of one despotism with another. A case
requiring consideration is that of a protracted civil war, in which the
contending parties are so equally balanced that there is no probability
of a speedy issue; or if there is, the victorious side cannot hope to
hope down the vanquished but by severities repugnant to humanity,
injurious to the permanent welfare of the country. In this exceptional
case it seems not to be an admitted doctrine, that the neighbouring
nations, or one powerful neighbour with the acquiescence of the rest,
are warranted in demanding that the contest shall cease, and a
reconciliation take place on equitable terms or compromise.

Intervention of this description has been repeatedly practised during
the present generation, with such general approval, that it legitimacy
may be considered to have passed into a maxum of what is called
international law. The interference of the European Powers between
Greece and Turkey, and between Holland and Belgium was still more
so. The intervention of England in Portugal, a few years ago, which is
probably less remembered than the others, because it took effect
without the employment of actual force, belongs in the same category.
At the time, this intervention had the appearance of a bad and
dishonest backing of the government against the people, being so
timed as to hit the exact moment when the popular party had obtained
a marked advantage, and seemed on the eve of overthrowing the
government, or reducing it to terms. But if ever a political act which
looked ill in the commencement could be justified by the event, this
was; for, as the fact turned out, instead of giving ascendancy to a
party, it proved a really healing measure; and the chiefs of the so-
called rebellion were, within a few years, the honoured and successful
ministers of the throne against which they had so lately fought.

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With respect to the question, whether one country is justified in helping the people of another in a struggle against their government for free institutions, the answer will be different, according as the yoke which the people are attempting to throw off is that of a purely native government, or of foreigners; considering as one of foreigners, every government which maintains itself by foreign support. When the contest is only with native rulers, and with such native strength as those rulers can enlist in their defence, the answer I should give to the question of the legitimacy of intervention is, as a general rule, No. The reason is, that there can seldom be anything approaching to assurance that intervention, even if successful, would be for the good of the people themselves. The only test possessing any real value, of a people's having become fit for popular institutions, is that they, or a sufficient portion of them to prevail in the contest, are willing to brave labour and danger for their liberation. I know all that may be said. I know it may be urged that the virtues of freemen cannot be learned in the school of slavery, and that if a people are not fit for freedom, to have any chance of becoming so they must first be free. And this would be conclusive, if the intervention recommended would really give them freedom. But the evil is, that if they have not sufficient love of liberty to be able to wrest it from merely domestic oppressors, the liberty which is bestowed on them by other hands than their own, will have nothing real, nothing permanent. No people ever was and remained free, but because it was determined to be so; because neither its rulers nor any other party in the nation could compel it to be otherwise. If a people - especially one who freedom has not yet become prescriptive - does not value it sufficiently to fight for it, and maintain it against any force which can be mustered within the country, even by those who have the command of the public revenue, it is only a question of how few years or months that people will be enslaved. Either the government which it has given to itself, or some military leader or knot of conspirators who contrive to subvert the government, will speedily put an end to all popular institutions: unless indeed it suits their convenience better to leave them standing, and be content with reducing them to mere forms; for, unless the spirit of liberty is strong in a people, those who have the executive in their hands easily work any institutions to the purposes of despotism. There is no sure guarantee against this deplorable issue, even in a country which has achieved its own freedom; as may be seen in the present day by striking examples both in the Old and New Worlds: but when freedom has been achieved for them, they have little prospect indeed of escaping this fate. When a people has had the misfortune to be ruled by a government under which the feelings and the virtues needful for maintaining freedom could not develop themselves, it is during an arduous struggle to become free by their own efforts that these feelings and virtues have the best chance of springing up. Men become attached to that which they have long fought for and made sacrifices for; they learned to appreciate that on which their thoughts have been much engaged; and a contest in which many have been called on to devote themselves for their country, is a school in which they learn to value their country's interest above their own.

It can seldom, therefore - I will go so far as to say never - be either judicious or right, in a country which has a free government, to assist, otherwise than by the moral support of its opinion, the endeavours of another to extort the same blessing from its native rulers. We must except, of course, any case in which such assistance is a measure of legitimate self-defence. If (a contingency by no means unlikely to occur) this country, on account of its freedom, which is a standing reproach to despotism everywhere, and an encouragement to throw it off, should find itself menaced with attack by a coalition of Continental despots, it ought to consider the popular party in every nation of the Continent as its natural ally: the Liberals should be to it, what the Protestants of Europe were to the Government of Queen Elizabeth. So, again, when a nation, in her own defence, has gone to war with a despot, and has had the rare good fortune not only to succeed in her resistance, but to hold the conditions of peace in her own hands, she is entitled to say that she will make no treaty, unless with some other ruler than the one whose existence as such may be a perpetual menace to her safety and freedom. These exceptions to but set in a clearer light the reasons of the rule; because they do not depend on any failure of those reasons, but on considerations paramount to them, and coming under a different principle.

But the case of a people struggling against a foreign yoke, or against a native tyranny upheld by foreign arms, illustrates the reasons for non-intervention in an opposite way; for in this case the reasons themselves do not exist. A people the most attached to freedom, the most capable of defending and of making a good use of free institutions, may be unable to contend successfully for them against the military strength of another nation much more powerful. To assist a people thus kept down, is not to disturb the balance of forces on which the permanent maintenance of freedom in a country depends, but to redress that balance when it is already unfairly and violently disturbed. The doctrine of non-intervention, to be a legitimate principle of morality, must be accepted by all governments. The despots must consent to be bound by it as well as the free States. Unless they do, the profession of it by free countries comes but to this miserable issue, that the wrong side may help the wrong, but the right must not help the right. Intervention to enforce non-intervention is always rightful, always moral, if not always prudent. Though it be a mistake to give freedom to a people who do not value it, they shall not be hindered from the pursuit of it by foreign coercion. It might not have been right for England (even apart from the question of prudence) to have taken part with Hungary in its noble struggle against Austria, although the Austrian Government in Hungary was in some sense a foreign yoke. But when, the Hungarians having shown themselves likely to prevail in this struggle, the Russian despot interposed, and joining his force to that of Austria, delivered back the Hungarians, bound hand and foot, to their exasperated oppressors, it would have been an honourable and virtuous act on the part of England to have declared that this should not be, and that if Russia gave assistance to the wrong side, England would aid the right. It might not have been consistent with the regard which every nation is bound to pay for its own safety, for England to have taken up this position single-handed, but England and France together could have done it; and if they had, the Russian armed intervention would never have taken place, or would have been disastrous to Russia alone; while all that those Powers gained by not doing it, was that they had to fight Russia five years afterwards, under more difficult circumstances, and without Hungary for an ally. The first nation which, being powerful enough to make its voice effectual, has the spirit and courage to say that not a gun shall be fired in Europe by the soldiers of one power against the revolted subjects of another, will be the idol of the friends of freedom throughout Europe. That declaration alone will ensure the almost immediate emancipation of every people which desires liberty sufficiently to be capable of maintaining it; and the nation which gives the word will soon find itself at the head of an alliance of free peoples, so strong as to defy the efforts of any number of confederated despots to bring it down. The prize is too glorious not to be snatched sooner or later by some free country; and the time may not be distant when England, if she does not take this heroic part because of its heresies, will be compelled to take it from consideration for her own safety.